Functions — github.com/ValarDragon/CTF-Crypto

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Functions69 in github.com/ValarDragon/CTF-Crypto

⨍ Functions 69 ◇ Types & classes 4

↓ 10 callersMethodmodinv

Modular Multiplicative Inverse, from https://rosettacode.org/wiki/Modular_inverse#Python

RSA/RSATool.py:611

↓ 8 callersMethodgeneratePrivKey

(self, modulus="modulus",pubexp="e",p="p",q="q",outFileName="None")

RSA/RSATool.py:620

↓ 5 callersMethodfloorSqrt

(self,n)

RSA/RSATool.py:591

↓ 4 callersFunctionnewAES

(key)

AES/MITM.py:23

↓ 2 callersMethodextended_gcd

Extended Euclidean Algorithm, from https://rosettacode.org/wiki/Modular_inverse#Python

RSA/RSATool.py:599

↓ 2 callersFunctionfranklinReiter

(n,e,r,c1,c2)

RSA/FranklinReiterSage.py:12

↓ 2 callersMethodgetCandidateA

(self,sieveModulus,N="RSA modulus",secondIter=False)

RSA/RSATool.py:231

↓ 2 callersMethodinvalidPubExponent

Recovers some bytes of ciphertext if n is factored, but e was invalid. (Like e=100) The vast majority of bytes are however lost, as we are tak

RSA/RSATool.py:433

↓ 2 callersMethodisLastDigitPossibleSquare

(self,x)

RSA/RSATool.py:162

↓ 2 callersMethodpollardf

(self,x)

RSA/RSATool.py:369

↓ 2 callersFunctionsToC

(s,e=3)

RSA/bleichenbacher.py:94

↓ 2 callersMethodsieveFermatAttack

(self,N="RSA modulus",sieveModulus=4500,limit=1000,fermatTimeout=3*60)

RSA/RSATool.py:260

↓ 2 callersFunctionsolve

(plaintext,ciphertext,KeyGen)

AES/MITM.py:9

↓ 2 callersMethodwienerAttack

(self,n="n",e="e",wienerTimeout=3*60)

RSA/RSATool.py:145

↓ 1 callersFunctionCoppersmithShortPadAttack

Coppersmith's Shortpad attack! Figured out from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coppersmith's_attack#Coppersmith.E2.80.99s_short-pad_attack

RSA/FranklinReiterSage.py:28

↓ 1 callersFunctionGenFakeKeys

(pubkey1)

Pairings/RogueKeyAttack.sage.py:7

↓ 1 callersFunctionGenFakeSignature

(b, hashedMsg)

Pairings/RogueKeyAttack.sage.py:17

↓ 1 callersFunctionTestRoguePublicKey

()

Pairings/RogueKeyAttack.sage.py:25

↓ 1 callersFunctioncheckBrokenPublicExponent

()

RSA/testScript.py:50

↓ 1 callersMethodcheckFactorDB

See if the modulus is already factored on factordb.com, and if so get the factors

RSA/RSATool.py:117

↓ 1 callersFunctioncheckHalfdPartialKeyRecoveryAttack

()

RSA/testScript.py:66

↓ 1 callersFunctioncheckSameModulusDifferentPubExp

()

RSA/testScript.py:82

↓ 1 callersFunctioncheckSievedFermatAttack

()

RSA/testScript.py:37

↓ 1 callersFunctioncheckdpPartialKeyRecoveryAttack

()

RSA/testScript.py:94

↓ 1 callersFunctionchunks

(l, n)

RSA/bleichenbacher.py:100

↓ 1 callersMethodcommonModulusPubExpSamePlainText

Solves for message if you have two ciphertexts of the same message encrypted with different public exponents and same modulus

RSA/RSATool.py:408

↓ 1 callersFunctioncompositeModulusGCD

(a, b)

RSA/FranklinReiterSage.py:22

↓ 1 callersMethodcontfrac_to_rational

(self, frac)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:27

↓ 1 callersMethodconvergents_from_contfrac

(self, frac)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:21

↓ 1 callersMethoddpPartialKeyRecoveryAttack

Recovers full private key given d_p for CRT version of RSA. Links: https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2003/27290027/27290027.

RSA/RSATool.py:525

↓ 1 callersMethodextended_gcd

Extended Euclidean Algorithm, from https://rosettacode.org/wiki/Modular_inverse#Python

Diffie Hellman/DiscreteLogarithmSolver.py:42

↓ 1 callersMethodfactorModulii

(self,pubkeys,outFileNameFormat="privkey-%s.pem")

RSA/RSATool.py:81

↓ 1 callersMethodfactorModulus

(self,pubKey="pubkey",e="e",n="n",outFileName="")

RSA/RSATool.py:27

↓ 1 callersMethodfloorSqrt

(self,n)

Diffie Hellman/DiscreteLogarithmSolver.py:63

↓ 1 callersMethodgenSquaresModSieve

(self,sieve)

RSA/RSATool.py:198

↓ 1 callersMethodhalfdPartialKeyRecoveryAttack

Recovers full private key given more than half of the private key. Links: http://www.ijser.org/researchpaper/Attack_on_RSA_Cr

RSA/RSATool.py:466

↓ 1 callersMethodis_perfect_square

(self, n)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:37

↓ 1 callersMethodisqrt

(self, n)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:51

↓ 1 callersFunctionknownMessageFormat

unknownEndBitIndex is measured from the LSB being bit #0 if unknownEndBitIndex is 0, it is knownMessageFormatUnkownAtEnd, but with epsilon so

RSA/partialKnownMessageSage.py:20

↓ 1 callersFunctionlinearPaddingHastads

Performs Hastads attack on raw RSA with no padding. This is for RSA encryptions of the form: cArray[i] = pow(aArray[i]*msg + bArray[i],e,nArr

RSA/hastadsSage.py:24

↓ 1 callersFunctionloadBostonKeyPartyPEMs

()

RSA/testScript.py:7

↓ 1 callersFunctionmain

()

RSA/testScript.py:12

↓ 1 callersFunctionmain

()

RSA/testScriptSage.py:10

↓ 1 callersMethodmodinv

Modular Multiplicative Inverse, from https://rosettacode.org/wiki/Modular_inverse#Python

Diffie Hellman/DiscreteLogarithmSolver.py:54

↓ 1 callersMethodpollardPminus1

(self,N="modulus",a=7,B=2**16,pMinus1Timeout=3*60)

RSA/RSATool.py:339

↓ 1 callersFunctionpython_rsa_bleichenbacher

This can forge RSA signatures for low exponents for the python RSA module, for any modulus The CVE was reported in http://www.openwall.com/li

RSA/bleichenbacher.py:6

↓ 1 callersMethodrational_to_contfrac

(self, x, y)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:12

↓ 1 callersMethodsmallPrimes

(self,n="n",upperlimit=1000000)

RSA/RSATool.py:320

↓ 1 callersFunctiontestAESMITM

(self, type, value, traceback)

(self, seconds=1, error_message='[*] Timeout')

RSA/RSATool.py:654

Method__init__

(self, n, e)

RSA/wienerAttack.py:63

MethodbabyStepGiantStep

Baby Step Giant Step algorithm from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby-step_giant-step Input: A cyclic group G of order n, having a g

Diffie Hellman/DiscreteLogarithmSolver.py:2

MethodbruteBestSieveModulus

(self,startVal,endVal,N="RSA modulus")

RSA/RSATool.py:307

MethodchineseRemainderTheorem

(self,moduliiValueDictionary)

RSA/RSATool.py:546

MethodfermatAttack

(self,n="n",limit=100,fermatTimeout=3*60)

RSA/RSATool.py:177

MethodgeneratePubKey

(self, modulus="modulus",pubexp="e",outFileName="None")

RSA/RSATool.py:639

Methodhandle_timeout

(self, signum, frame)

RSA/RSATool.py:657

Functionhastads

Performs Hastads attack on raw RSA with no padding. cArray = Ciphertext Array nArray = Modulus Array e = public exponent

RSA/hastadsSage.py:6

FunctionknownMessageFormatUnkownAtEnd

(prefix,e,n,c,eps=_sage_const_1 /_sage_const_8 )

RSA/partialKnownMessageSage.py:6

MethodpollardsRho

(self,n="modulus",rhoTimeout=5*60)

RSA/RSATool.py:372

Functionsample_KeyGen

()

AES/MITM.py:26

FunctiontestCoppersmithShortPadAttack

(eps=_sage_const_1 /_sage_const_25 )

RSA/FranklinReiterSage.py:63

FunctiontestFranklinReiter

()

RSA/FranklinReiterSage.py:84

FunctiontestFunction

()

RSA/bleichenbacher.py:104

FunctiontestKnownMessageFormat

()

RSA/partialKnownMessageSage.py:45

FunctiontestLinearPadding

()

RSA/hastadsSage.py:63