Obtain the non-zero at i position

Done by the credential receiver

Create a new sub-proof that can be verified by someone with the secret key

Create a new sub-proof that can be verified by someone with the secret key

Obtain the number of digits in the base representation Num of digits in single proof times the number of proofs

Transform the ECDSA signature received from user (likely from the secure hardware) to be verifiable by the blinded public key.

Transform the message to be given to ECDSA signing. Called before generating signature and thus before calling `Self::transform_ecdsa_sig`

Transpose an 8x8 bit matrix given as a u64. The code is taken from the book Hacker's Delight's figure 7.6 after slight modification. In the book's cod

Attempts to apply given `f` to the mutable reference of each contained entity producing a new `SecretKeyModel`.

Ensures that the given iterator satisfies provided validator for each successful item. In case of an error, `Err(E)` will be emitted.

Update the membership witness on adding an element. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the membership witness on removal of an element. Call this on the accumulator after update

Update the membership witnesses on addition of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the membership witnesses on removal of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the membership witnesses on addition and removal of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the non-membership witness on adding an element. Call this on the accumulator after update

Update the non-membership witness on removal of an element. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the non-membership witnesses on addition of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the non-membership witnesses on removal of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Update the non-membership witnesses on addition and removal of a batch of elements. Call this on the accumulator before update

Verify if the proof is valid. Assumes that the public key and parameters have been validated already.

Verify the validity of the signature. Assumes that the public key and parameters have been validated already.

Check the proof that `a + b = t` Its assumed that verifier "trusts" that commitment to point `a`, `b` and `t` are `comm_a`, `comm_b` and `comm_t` resp

For verifying `base * scalar = result` where `comm_scalar` and `comm_result` are commitments to `scalar` and `result` respectively

Verify the argument.

Compute the commitment C and run the norm arg on it C = S + t*M + t^2*D + t^3*R + 2t^5*V + P P = <g_vec_pub_offsets, G_vec> + g_offset*G

Executed by each participant to verify its share received from the dealer. Also, should be called by the "reconstructor" to verify that each of the sh

Verify the proof for `0 <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

Verify the proof for `min <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

Verifies that `k_{l} = \sum_{j}(beta_tilde_{j} * m_{l}{j} + g_tilde * r_{l})`.

Same as `Self::verify_decryption` but used randomized pairing checker

Same as `Self::verify` except that it does not take the commitment directly but takes the `bases` and `scalars` whose inner product (MSM) gives the co

Verify the proof for `0 <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

Verify the proof for `min <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

Verify the proof for `0 <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

Verify the proof for `min <= value < max` where `commitment` is a Pedersen commitment to `value`

verify_kzg_opening_g2 takes a KZG opening, the final commitment key, SRS and any shift (in TIPP we shift the v commitment by r^-1) and returns a pairi

Similar to verify_kzg_opening_g2 but for g1.

Verify the proof of the Subspace Snark on the equality of openings of cp_link and proof.d

Check if element is absent in accumulator. Described in section 2 of the paper This takes `self` as an argument, but the secret `f_V` isn't used; thus

Similar to `Self::verify` but responses for some messages (witnesses) are provided in `missing_responses`. The keys of the map are message indices.

Similar to `Self::verify_schnorr_proof` but responses for some messages (witnesses) are provided in `missing_responses`. The keys of the map are messa

Verify that the snark proof and the Schnorr proof are valid.

Same as `Self::verify` but delegated the scalar multiplication checks to `RandomizedMultChecker`

Same as `Self::verify` but delegated the scalar multiplication checks to `RandomizedMultChecker`

Same as `Self::verify` but delegated the scalar multiplication checks to `RandomizedMultChecker`

Write a 32-byte value `v` in little-endian format at the offset `i`