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hub / github.com/base/base / validate_actor_changes

Method validate_actor_changes

crates/execution/txpool/src/validator.rs:2103–2158  ·  view source on GitHub ↗

Validates a signed batch's `changes`: the slice is bounded by [`Eip8130Constants::MAX_ACTOR_CHANGES_PER_CONFIG`], plus the reserved-window authenticator bound for the *new* actor of each `AuthorizeActor` op. Repeated `actorId` targets are *not* rejected here: unlike `Create.initial_actors`, the contract and the enshrined apply path process a batch's ops sequentially (authorize upserts, revoke clea

(changes: &[SignedChange])

Source from the content-addressed store, hash-verified

2101 /// - `Lock` / `Unlock`: their apply handlers are not yet enshrined, so a batch
2102 /// carrying one is rejected here rather than admitted and failed later.
2103 fn validate_actor_changes(changes: &[SignedChange]) -> Result<(), InvalidPoolTransactionError> {
2104 if changes.len() > Eip8130Constants::MAX_ACTOR_CHANGES_PER_CONFIG {
2105 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2106 }
2107 for change in changes {
2108 // Per-op structural well-formedness only. Repeated `actorId` targets
2109 // are intentionally NOT rejected: Keystore and the enshrined apply
2110 // path process a batch's ops in order (`AuthorizeActor` is an upsert,
2111 // `RevokeActor` clears), so a repeated target is valid on-chain (the
2112 // last write wins). Rejecting it here would drop a protocol-valid
2113 // batch, so the pool matches consensus and admits it.
2114 match change.change_type {
2115 ChangeType::AuthorizeActor => {
2116 // `payload` = `abi.encode(bytes32 actorId, ActorConfig, bytes)`;
2117 // the new actor's authenticator is the right-aligned address
2118 // in the second word.
2119 if change.payload.len() < 64 {
2120 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2121 }
2122 // The target `actorId` is `payload[0..32]`. `bytes32(0)` is the
2123 // reserved "no actor" sentinel and can never be authorized;
2124 // reject it up front to match `_authorizeActor`'s
2125 // `InvalidActorId` (the enshrined apply path rejects it too).
2126 if change.payload[..32].iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
2127 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2128 }
2129 // The authenticator word is an ABI-encoded `address`: its
2130 // leading 12 bytes are zero padding. Reject dirty upper bits so
2131 // the gate and a strict ABI decoder downstream agree.
2132 if change.payload[32..44].iter().any(|&b| b != 0) {
2133 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2134 }
2135 let authenticator = Address::from_slice(&change.payload[44..64]);
2136 if Self::authenticator_out_of_range(&authenticator) {
2137 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2138 }
2139 }
2140 ChangeType::RevokeActor => {
2141 if change.payload.len() != 32 {
2142 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2143 }
2144 }
2145 ChangeType::IncrementLocalEpoch => {
2146 if !change.payload.is_empty() {
2147 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2148 }
2149 // Names no actor; skip the target-dedup.
2150 continue;
2151 }
2152 ChangeType::Lock | ChangeType::Unlock => {
2153 return Err(InvalidTransactionError::TxTypeNotSupported.into());
2154 }
2155 }
2156 }
2157 Ok(())
2158 }
2159
2160 /// Performs the necessary Base-specific checks based on top of the regular eth outcome.

Callers

nothing calls this directly

Calls 4

lenMethod · 0.45
allMethod · 0.45
iterMethod · 0.45
is_emptyMethod · 0.45

Tested by

no test coverage detected