`SubmitAttestation`: a remote sandbox's session-end attestation — the signed audit node its agent created — plus the session state file it verifies under, saved in the repository (CB-12B). The gate that decides whether a managed change may cross a publication boundary needs two things this sandbox holds and no other transport carries: a same-session attestation over the change, and the session MA
(
&self,
request: Request<SubmitAttestationRequest>,
)
| 864 | /// owner may resolve DID keys later — signature policy is not the |
| 865 | /// transport's to decide). |
| 866 | async fn submit_attestation( |
| 867 | &self, |
| 868 | request: Request<SubmitAttestationRequest>, |
| 869 | ) -> Result<Response<SubmitAttestationResponse>, Status> { |
| 870 | let caller = self.state.sandbox_caller(&request)?; |
| 871 | let request = request.into_inner(); |
| 872 | let repository = repository_ref(&request.repository)?; |
| 873 | let handle = self.state.resolve(&repository)?; |
| 874 | self.state.log_rpc("SubmitAttestation", Some(&handle)); |
| 875 | let view = data_view( |
| 876 | caller.as_ref(), |
| 877 | &handle, |
| 878 | &repository, |
| 879 | request.target.as_ref(), |
| 880 | "attestation.write", |
| 881 | )?; |
| 882 | let session_id = request.session_id; |
| 883 | if session_id.is_empty() { |
| 884 | return Err(invalid("session_id is required")); |
| 885 | } |
| 886 | let bytes = wire::attestation_from(request.attestation.as_ref()).map_err(invalid)?; |
| 887 | let attestation = match atomic_core::change::attestation::Attestation::deserialize(&bytes) { |
| 888 | Ok((attestation, _)) => attestation, |
| 889 | Err(e) => { |
| 890 | return Ok(Response::new(SubmitAttestationResponse { |
| 891 | outcome: Some(submit_attestation_response::Outcome::Refused( |
| 892 | wire::rejection_error_info(&SubmitRejection::Malformed(e.to_string())), |
| 893 | )), |
| 894 | meta: response_meta(&request.meta), |
| 895 | })) |
| 896 | } |
| 897 | }; |
| 898 | if attestation.session_id != session_id { |
| 899 | return Err(invalid("the attestation names another session")); |
| 900 | } |
| 901 | if let Some(caller) = &caller { |
| 902 | let owns = self |
| 903 | .state |
| 904 | .sandbox_grants() |
| 905 | .owns_session(&caller.grant, &session_id) |
| 906 | .map_err(|e| e.status())?; |
| 907 | if !owns { |
| 908 | return Err(domain_status( |
| 909 | ErrorCode::Forbidden, |
| 910 | format!( |
| 911 | "session '{}' is not this sandbox's (view '{}')", |
| 912 | session_id, |
| 913 | caller.view() |
| 914 | ), |
| 915 | )); |
| 916 | } |
| 917 | } |
| 918 | let meta = request.meta.clone(); |
| 919 | let session_json = request.session_json; |
| 920 | let gate_handle = handle.clone(); |
| 921 | let _gate = gate_handle.exclusive().await; |
| 922 | if let Some(caller) = &caller { |
| 923 | caller.revalidate(&self.state)?; |
nothing calls this directly
no test coverage detected