May the binding's provenance/attestation roots be trusted? True only when the signature verifies, the signer is trusted under policy, and the content verified. Unknown or revoked signers always yield `false`, even with byte-perfect content.
(&self)
| 30 | /// policy, and the content verified. Unknown or revoked signers always |
| 31 | /// yield `false`, even with byte-perfect content. |
| 32 | pub fn provenance_trusted(&self) -> bool { |
| 33 | self.signature_valid && self.signer_trust == SignerTrust::Trusted && self.content_verified |
| 34 | } |
| 35 | |
| 36 | /// May the recomputed content be used for resurrection? |
| 37 | /// |
no outgoing calls
no test coverage detected