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Function forbidden_path

atomic-repository/src/repository/remote_cache.rs:168–193  ·  view source on GitHub ↗

Whether `path` may not be recorded, from a sandbox or otherwise. Refused in two cases: the path is not a plain relative path, or it names the repository's own machinery. The first is not a nicety. A submitted change lands in `TREE`, and the next materialize or view switch writes `root.join(path)` — so `../../elsewhere/x` escapes the working tree, with no local user in the loop when a remote token

(path: &str)

Source from the content-addressed store, hash-verified

166/// An empty path is not a path: a `FileOps` group for a token-level operation
167/// names an inode and carries no path, and there is nothing to escape with.
168pub(crate) fn forbidden_path(path: &str) -> bool {
169 if path.is_empty() {
170 return false;
171 }
172 let relative = std::path::Path::new(path);
173 if relative.is_absolute() {
174 return true;
175 }
176 // `components()` collapses repeated separators, so `src//main.rs` would
177 // read here as two plain names — and then reach `TREE` as a path no
178 // materialization can ever put a file at, because the write normalizes it
179 // back to `src/main.rs`.
180 if path.contains("//") || path.ends_with('/') {
181 return true;
182 }
183 relative.components().any(|part| match part {
184 // Not `Normal` means empty, `.`, `..`, or a root/prefix: none of which
185 // a tracked file may have.
186 std::path::Component::Normal(name) => {
187 name == crate::DOT_DIR
188 || name == super::SANDBOX_POINTER
189 || name == super::SANDBOX_CACHE_DIR
190 }
191 _ => true,
192 })
193}
194
195/// Where a materialized entry may land: inside `dir`, and nowhere else.
196///

Callers 1

Calls 3

componentsMethod · 0.80
is_emptyMethod · 0.45
containsMethod · 0.45

Tested by

no test coverage detected