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Function evaluate_binding_trust

atomic-repository/src/git_binding/trust.rs:66–84  ·  view source on GitHub ↗

Evaluate one binding: signature validity, signer trust, and content validity stay separate fields; provenance trust requires all three. `content_verified` must come from [`super::verify_binding_content`] (and, in CB-6C, from complete tree recomputation) — never from the signature.

(
    binding: &GitStateBinding,
    policy: &GitTrustConfig,
    input: BindingVerificationInput<'_>,
    content_verified: bool,
)

Source from the content-addressed store, hash-verified

64/// `content_verified` must come from [`super::verify_binding_content`] (and,
65/// in CB-6C, from complete tree recomputation) — never from the signature.
66pub fn evaluate_binding_trust(
67 binding: &GitStateBinding,
68 policy: &GitTrustConfig,
69 input: BindingVerificationInput<'_>,
70 content_verified: bool,
71) -> BindingTrustEvaluation {
72 let signature_valid = binding.verify_signature().is_ok();
73 let signer_trust = if signature_valid {
74 policy.evaluate(&binding.payload().signer.did, input.repository_identity)
75 } else {
76 // An unverifiable signature is never trusted, whatever the policy.
77 SignerTrust::Unknown
78 };
79 BindingTrustEvaluation {
80 signature_valid,
81 signer_trust,
82 content_verified,
83 }
84}
85
86/// Convenience: signer trust for a DID under the policy, with the repository
87/// identity as the default trust root.

Callers 4

verifyFunction · 0.85
fetchFunction · 0.85
evaluate_trustMethod · 0.85

Calls 3

verify_signatureMethod · 0.45
evaluateMethod · 0.45
payloadMethod · 0.45