Does the identity record a server returned actually belong to `did`? The failure modes are deliberately unified into one error: a missing key (an old server behind this endpoint), an unparseable key, and a key that simply is not the one the DID fingerprints all mean "this answer cannot be trusted for signature verification", and letting any of them through as success would accept a spoofed signer
(did: &str, info: &IdentityInfo)
| 583 | /// be trusted for signature verification", and letting any of them through |
| 584 | /// as success would accept a spoofed signer. |
| 585 | fn verify_did_binding(did: &str, info: &IdentityInfo) -> Result<(), RemoteError> { |
| 586 | let key_b32 = info.public_key.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| { |
| 587 | RemoteError::other("identity lookup by DID returned no public key to verify") |
| 588 | })?; |
| 589 | let public_key = atomic_identity::keypair::PublicKey::from_base32(key_b32) |
| 590 | .map_err(|e| RemoteError::other(format!("returned public key is unusable: {e}")))?; |
| 591 | if atomic_canonical::did::did_matches_public_key(did, &public_key) { |
| 592 | Ok(()) |
| 593 | } else { |
| 594 | Err(RemoteError::other(format!( |
| 595 | "server returned public key {key_b32} that does not match DID {did}" |
| 596 | ))) |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | } |
| 599 | |
| 600 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 601 | mod tests { |
no test coverage detected