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hub / github.com/atomicdotdev/atomic / check_permission

Function check_permission

atomic-remote/src/auth/delegation.rs:251–291  ·  view source on GitHub ↗

Pre-flight a specific operation before paying for a network round trip. The server is the authority and re-checks everything; this exists so an out-of-scope push fails with "your agent may not push to acme/api" instead of an opaque 403 after the upload.

(
    resolved: &ResolvedDelegation,
    permission: DelegationPermission,
    resource: &ResourceRef<'_>,
    identity_name: &str,
)

Source from the content-addressed store, hash-verified

249/// out-of-scope push fails with "your agent may not push to acme/api" instead
250/// of an opaque 403 after the upload.
251pub fn check_permission(
252 resolved: &ResolvedDelegation,
253 permission: DelegationPermission,
254 resource: &ResourceRef<'_>,
255 identity_name: &str,
256) -> AuthResult<()> {
257 if resolved.delegation.allows(permission, resource) {
258 return Ok(());
259 }
260
261 let granted = resolved
262 .delegation
263 .scope
264 .permissions
265 .iter()
266 .map(|p| p.to_string())
267 .collect::<Vec<_>>()
268 .join(", ");
269
270 let mut message = format!(
271 "Agent '{identity_name}' is not authorized to {permission} here.\n \
272 Granted: {granted}"
273 );
274 if let Some(project) = resource.project {
275 if !resolved.delegation.scope.allows_project(project) {
276 message.push_str(&format!(
277 "\n Scoped to projects: {}\n Requested: {project}",
278 if resolved.delegation.scope.projects.is_empty() {
279 "(all)".to_string()
280 } else {
281 resolved.delegation.scope.projects.join(", ")
282 }
283 ));
284 }
285 }
286 message.push_str(&format!(
287 "\n Widen it with: atomic identity delegate {identity_name} --can {permission}"
288 ));
289
290 Err(AuthError::DelegationError { message })
291}
292
293#[cfg(test)]
294mod tests {

Calls 3

allows_projectMethod · 0.80
allowsMethod · 0.45
iterMethod · 0.45

Tested by

no test coverage detected