Function hasSuspiciousWindowsPathPattern

src/utils/permissions/filesystem.ts:537–602

* Detects suspicious Windows path patterns that could bypass security checks. * These patterns include: * - NTFS Alternate Data Streams (e.g., file.txt::$DATA or file.txt:stream) * - 8.3 short names (e.g., GIT~1, CLAUDE~1, SETTIN~1.JSON) * - Long path prefixes (e.g., \\?\C:\..., \\.\C:\..., //?/

(path: string)

 * @returns true if suspicious Windows path patterns are detected
 */
function hasSuspiciousWindowsPathPattern(path: string): boolean {
  // Check for NTFS Alternate Data Streams
  // Look for ':' after position 2 to skip drive letters (e.g., C:\)
  // Examples: file.txt::$DATA, .bashrc:hidden, settings.json:stream
  // Note: ADS colon syntax is only interpreted by the Windows kernel. On WSL,
  // DrvFs mounts route file operations through the Windows kernel, so colon
  // syntax is still interpreted as ADS separators. On Linux/macOS (non-WSL),
  // even when NTFS is mounted, ADS is accessed via xattrs (ntfs-3g) not colon
  // syntax, and colons are valid filename characters.
  if (getPlatform() === 'windows' || getPlatform() === 'wsl') {
    const colonIndex = path.indexOf(':', 2)
    if (colonIndex !== -1) {
      return true
    }
  }

  // Check for 8.3 short names
  // Look for '~' followed by a digit
  // Examples: GIT~1, CLAUDE~1, SETTIN~1.JSON, BASHRC~1
  if (/~\d/.test(path)) {
    return true
  }

  // Check for long path prefixes (both backslash and forward slash variants)
  // Examples: \\?\C:\Users\..., \\.\C:\..., //?/C:/..., //./C:/...
  if (
    path.startsWith('\\\\?\\') ||
    path.startsWith('\\\\.\\') ||
    path.startsWith('//?/') ||
    path.startsWith('//./')
  ) {
    return true
  }

  // Check for trailing dots and spaces that Windows strips during path resolution
  // Examples: .git., .claude , .bashrc..., settings.json.
  // This can bypass string matching if ".git" is blocked but ".git." is used
  if (/[.\s]+$/.test(path)) {
    return true
  }

  // Check for DOS device names that Windows treats as special devices
  // Examples: .git.CON, settings.json.PRN, .bashrc.AUX
  // Device names: CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1-9, LPT1-9
  if (/\.(CON|PRN|AUX|NUL|COM[1-9]|LPT[1-9])$/i.test(path)) {
    return true
  }

  // Check for three or more consecutive dots (...) when used as a path component
  // This pattern can be used to bypass security checks or create confusion
  // Examples: .../file.txt, path/.../file
  // Only block when dots are preceded AND followed by path separators (/ or \)
  // This allows legitimate uses like Next.js catch-all routes [...]name]
  if (/(^|\/|\\)\.{3,}(\/|\\|$)/.test(path)) {
    return true
  }

  // Check for UNC paths (on all platforms for defense-in-depth)