(origin: string, token: string | null)
| 325 | }; |
| 326 | |
| 327 | const installBearerAuthHeader = (origin: string, token: string | null) => { |
| 328 | authHeaderUnsubscribe?.(); |
| 329 | authHeaderUnsubscribe = null; |
| 330 | if (!token) return; |
| 331 | const headerValue = `Bearer ${token}`; |
| 332 | session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders( |
| 333 | { urls: [`${origin}/*`] }, |
| 334 | (details, callback) => { |
| 335 | // Scope the bearer to the app's OWN renderer. OAuth popups run in this same |
| 336 | // session but load third-party provider pages; auto-attaching the bearer to |
| 337 | // any request they make to the sidecar would make it an ambient credential |
| 338 | // (a CSRF vector) for untrusted content — the very thing the bearer model |
| 339 | // exists to avoid. The popup only ever needs the bearer-exempt |
| 340 | // /oauth/callback and hands its result back via same-origin browser |
| 341 | // channels (localStorage/postMessage), so withholding the bearer from any |
| 342 | // non-app webContents is safe. Requests with no webContentsId (main |
| 343 | // process / network service) still get it. |
| 344 | const fromOtherWebContents = |
| 345 | details.webContentsId !== undefined && |
| 346 | (mainWindow === null || details.webContentsId !== mainWindow.webContents.id); |
| 347 | if (fromOtherWebContents) { |
| 348 | callback({ requestHeaders: details.requestHeaders }); |
| 349 | return; |
| 350 | } |
| 351 | callback({ |
| 352 | requestHeaders: { |
| 353 | ...details.requestHeaders, |
| 354 | Authorization: headerValue, |
| 355 | }, |
| 356 | }); |
| 357 | }, |
| 358 | ); |
| 359 | authHeaderUnsubscribe = () => { |
| 360 | session.defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders({ urls: [`${origin}/*`] }, null); |
| 361 | }; |
| 362 | }; |
| 363 | |
| 364 | /** |
| 365 | * Resolve the on-disk path to the Executor app icon. Packaged builds get |
no test coverage detected