If Fermat's prime criterion is false by short circuit we don't need to keep testing bases, so we return false for a guaranteed composite. Oth

Attack implementation

Same n huge e attack

Hastad attack for low public exponent this has found success for e = 3

Common modulus attack

use elliptic curve method, may return a prime or may never return only works if the sageworks() function returned True

Search for previously used primes in CTFs

Run tests against factorial +-1 composites

Do nothing, used for multi-key attacks that succeeded so we just print the private key without spending any time factoring

try to factorize n when is in the form: root^x, with root prime

Run attack with Pollard P1

Run lehmer_machine attack with a timeout

Search for rapid7 gcd primes

Run attack with Pollard Rho

Run Hart's attack with a timeout

Run tests against mersenne primes

Factors available online?

Try to decrypt c if m < n/e and small e

System primes in crypto constants

Try to factorize using yafu

Run tests against primorial +-1 composites

Run tests against Lucas numbers

Pisano(mersenne) period factorization algorithm optimal for keys sub 70 bits in less than a minute. The attack is very similar to lon

Run the Quadratic Sieve factorisation attack

Run tests against mersenne composites

use elliptic curve method only works if the sageworks() function returned True

Run FactorHighAndLowBitsEqual attack with a timeout

"primes" of the form 31337 - 313333337 - see ekoparty 2015 "rsa 2070" not all numbers in this form are prime but some are (25 digit is prime)

Wiener's attack

Run pollard_strassen attack with a timeout

Qi Cheng - A New Class of Unsafe Primes

Run factor (2P)N form attack with a timeout

Run prime_base_collision attack with a timeout

Use boneh durfee method, should return a d value, else returns 0 only works if the sageworks() function returned True many of these pr

Run (X^Y)(X^Z) form attack with a timeout

Run fermat attack with a timeout

Run Shor attack with a timeout

Factor n if mininum of crt exponent is small enough

Run fermat attack with a timeout

Run lehman attack with a timeout

Code/idea from RsaCtfTool.Renaud Lifchitz's talk 15 ways to break RSA security @ OPCDE17 only works if the sageworks() function returned True

Run strong_pseudoprime attack with a timeout

Run kraitchik attack with a timeout

Run Dixon's smooth-number factorisation attack

Run tests against factorial +-1 composites

Run tests against fermat composites

Run tests against fermat composites

Run attack with Pollard Rho-brent

Try an attack where q < 100,000, from RsaCtfTool.BKPCTF2016 - sourcekris

Run attack with Euler method

Run fermat attack with a timeout

Run attacks on multiple keys

Attack wrapper to include timer in all attacks

Checks the given list of public key files for the ROCA vulnerability. Args: args (Namespace): Command line arguments or configuratio

source: https://web.archive.org/web/20201031000312/https://grocid.net/2017/09/16/finding-close-prime-factorizations/

Taken from https://github.com/mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks/blob/master/coppersmith.sage Coppersmith revisited by Howgrave-Graham finds a so

Decrypts files specified in args.decryptfile using the provided private key, or prepares files for decryption with a public key. Note: Curren

Idea based on: https://github.com/trizen/perl-scripts/blob/master/Math/difference_of_powers_factorization_method.pl

Try to solve the discrete logarithm problem: x for g^x == h (mod p) with brute force.

Perform attack

helper function to load a partial mangled asn1 PEM private key into an array of integers version, modulus(n), exponent(e), d, prime(p), prime