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Security scanner for AI agent skills. Detect vulnerabilities, malicious patterns, and security risks before installing agent skills.
AI agent skills (used by Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, etc.) execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting. Research shows that 26.1% of skills contain vulnerabilities and 5.2% show likely malicious intent.
SkillSpector helps you answer: "Is this skill safe to install?"
Create and activate a virtual environment first (all make targets assume the venv is active). Use uv or pip; the Makefile uses uv if available, otherwise pip.
Quick install with uv (CLI-only):
uv tool install git+https://github.com/NVIDIA/skillspector.git
# Update later: uv tool update skillspector
If you plan to run skillspector mcp, install the MCP extra at install time:
uv tool install 'skillspector[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/NVIDIA/skillspector.git'
From source:
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/NVIDIA/skillspector.git
cd skillspector
# Create and activate virtual environment
uv venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
# or: python3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
# Install for production use
make install
# Or install with development dependencies
make install-dev
Run SkillSpector without installing Python by building it locally from the included Dockerfile. The image is based on the Docker Official Python 3.12-slim-bookworm image.
Build the image:
make docker-build
# or: docker build -t skillspector .
Scan a local directory by mounting your current directory into /scan, the container's working directory:
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --no-llm
Scan with LLM analysis by passing credentials with a local .env file:
cat > .env <<'EOF'
SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=anthropic
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
EOF
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD:/scan" \
--env-file .env \
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
Or pass credentials directly from your shell environment:
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD:/scan" \
-e SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=anthropic \
-e ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" \
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
Write a report to the host filesystem by writing to the mounted directory:
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD:/scan" \
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --no-llm --format json --output report.json
Optional alias for repeated static scans:
alias skillspector-docker='docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" skillspector'
skillspector-docker scan ./my-skill/ --no-llm
# Scan a local skill directory
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Scan a single SKILL.md file
skillspector scan ./SKILL.md
# Scan a Git repository
skillspector scan https://github.com/user/my-skill
# Scan a zip file
skillspector scan ./my-skill.zip
# Terminal output (default) - pretty formatted
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# JSON output - machine readable
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --format json --output report.json
# Markdown output - for documentation
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --format markdown --output report.md
# SARIF output - for CI/CD integration and IDE tooling
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --format sarif --output report.sarif
Suppress known/accepted findings so the risk score reflects only un-triaged issues and re-scans surface only new findings. See the suppression guide for the full reference.
# Accept all current findings into a baseline (run once), then commit it.
skillspector baseline ./my-skill/ -o .skillspector-baseline.yaml
# Scan against the baseline — only NEW findings are reported and scored.
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --baseline .skillspector-baseline.yaml
# Review what was suppressed (still excluded from the score).
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --baseline .skillspector-baseline.yaml --show-suppressed
A baseline can also use drift-tolerant glob rules (by rule id, file path, or
message) — see .skillspector-baseline.example.yaml.
For the best results, configure an OpenAI-compatible LLM endpoint for
semantic analysis. Pick a provider with SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER; each
ships its own bundled default model. SkillSpector also works against
local OpenAI-compatible servers (Ollama, vLLM, llama.cpp) and managed
inference gateways.
Provider (SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER) |
Credential env var | Endpoint | Default model |
|---|---|---|---|
openai |
OPENAI_API_KEY (+ optional OPENAI_BASE_URL) |
api.openai.com (or any OpenAI-compatible URL) | gpt-5.4 |
anthropic |
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
api.anthropic.com | claude-opus-4-6 |
anthropic_proxy |
ANTHROPIC_PROXY_API_KEY + ANTHROPIC_PROXY_ENDPOINT_URL |
Any Vertex-style raw-predict proxy | claude-sonnet-4-6 |
bedrock |
AWS_PROFILE (optional) + AWS_REGION — SigV4 via boto3 |
AWS Bedrock Runtime | us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6-20250915-v1:0 |
nv_build |
NVIDIA_INFERENCE_KEY |
build.nvidia.com | deepseek-ai/deepseek-v4-flash |
claude_cli |
(none — uses local CLI auth) | local claude binary |
claude-sonnet-4-6 |
codex_cli |
(none — uses local CLI auth) | local codex binary |
o4-mini |
# Stock OpenAI
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=openai
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Anthropic
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=anthropic
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Anthropic via Vertex-style proxy (corporate gateways, GCP Vertex AI)
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=anthropic_proxy
export ANTHROPIC_PROXY_ENDPOINT_URL=https://my-gateway.example.com/models/claude-sonnet-4-6:streamRawPredict
export ANTHROPIC_PROXY_API_KEY=your-bearer-token
export SKILLSPECTOR_MODEL=claude-sonnet-4-6
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# AWS Bedrock (Claude via SigV4)
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=bedrock
# Optional: select an AWS named profile. When unset, the standard
# boto3 credential chain (env vars, instance metadata, SSO, etc.) resolves.
# export AWS_PROFILE=my-profile
export AWS_REGION=us-west-2 # default if unset
# Default model: us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6-20250915-v1:0
# Override with any Bedrock model ID, cross-region inference-profile
# ID, or your own application-inference-profile ARN:
# export SKILLSPECTOR_MODEL=us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-20250915-v1:0
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# NVIDIA build.nvidia.com
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=nv_build
export NVIDIA_INFERENCE_KEY=nvapi-...
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Local Claude CLI — no API key; uses your existing `claude auth login` session
# Requires: claude CLI installed and authenticated (claude auth login)
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=claude_cli
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Local Codex CLI — no API key; uses your existing `codex login` session
# Requires: codex CLI installed and authenticated
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=codex_cli
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Local Ollama or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
export SKILLSPECTOR_PROVIDER=openai
export OPENAI_API_KEY=ollama
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434/v1
export SKILLSPECTOR_MODEL=llama3.1:8b
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Override the provider's default model
export SKILLSPECTOR_MODEL=gpt-5.2
skillspector scan ./my-skill/
# Skip LLM analysis (faster, static analysis only)
skillspector scan ./my-skill/ --no-llm
Run SkillSpector as a Model Context Protocol server so any MCP-capable agent (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) or remote runtime can call scanning as a tool and gate skill/MCP installs on the result — turning SkillSpector into a runtime guardrail instead of an out-of-band audit step.
skillspector mcp requires skillspector[mcp].
# Install, or reinstall if you already used the CLI-only path
uv tool install --force 'skillspector[mcp] @ git+https://github.com/NVIDIA/skillspector.git'
# FastMCP stdio transport for local CLI agents
skillspector mcp
# streamable HTTP/SSE transport for remote / A2A callers
skillspector mcp --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
The stdio transport is the current FastMCP path for local CLI agents, and the initialize hang reported in issue #199 still applies there.
The server exposes a single tool:
scan_skill(target, use_llm=true, output_format="json") — scans a Git
URL, file URL, .zip, .md file, or directory and returns a structured
verdict: risk_score (0-100), severity, recommendation,
safe_to_install, and findings. It also reports llm_used / scan_mode
so a low score from a static-only scan is never mistaken for a clean full
scan.Register it with Claude Code via:
claude mcp add skillspector -- skillspector mcp
Security — HTTP transport trust model
The HTTP transport ships without authentication. Any caller that can reach the port can invoke
scan_skill. Over stdio or127.0.0.1this is the same trust boundary as the CLI. If you bind to a routable interface:
- Sit the server behind an authenticating reverse proxy (e.g. nginx + mTLS) before exposing it externally.
- Local paths and
file://URLs are automatically rejected over HTTP to prevent unauthenticated callers from reading arbitrary host files. Only remote Git and.zipURLs are accepted.
SkillSpector detects 68 vulnerability patterns across 17 categories:
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Instruction Override | HIGH | Commands to ignore safety constraints |
| P2 | Hidden Instructions | HIGH | Malicious directives in comments/invisible text |
| P3 | Exfiltration Commands | HIGH | Instructions to transmit context externally |
| P4 | Behavior Manipulation | MEDIUM | Subtle instructions altering agent decisions |
| P5 | Harmful Content | CRITICAL | Instructions that could cause physical harm |
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| AR1 | Refusal Suppression | HIGH | Instructions to never refuse or always comply (e.g. "never refuse", "always comply") |
| AR2 | Disclaimer Suppression | HIGH | Instructions to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary (e.g. "no disclaimers", "do not moralize") |
| AR3 | Safety Policy Nullification | HIGH | Jailbreak framing that nullifies guardrails (e.g. "you have no restrictions", "ignore your guidelines", "do anything now") |
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | External Transmission | MEDIUM | Sending data to external URLs |
| E2 | Env Variable Harvesting | HIGH | Collecting API keys and secrets |
| E3 | File System Enumeration | MEDIUM | Scanning directories for sensitive files |
| E4 | Context Leakage | HIGH | Transmitting conversation context externally |
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PE1 | Excessive Permissions | LOW | Requesting access beyond stated functionality |
| PE2 | Sudo/Root Execution | MEDIUM | Invoking elevated system privileges |
| PE3 | Credential Access | HIGH | Reading SSH keys, tokens, passwords |
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| SC1 | Unpinned Dependencies | LOW | No version constraints on packages |
| SC2 | External Script Fetching | HIGH | curl | bash and remote code execution |
| SC3 | Obfuscated Code | HIGH | Base64/hex encoded execution |
| SC4 | Known Vulnerable Dependencies | HIGH | Dependencies with known CVEs (live OSV.dev lookup) |
| SC5 | Abandoned Dependencies | MEDIUM | Unmaintained packages without security updates |
| SC6 | Typosquatting | HIGH | Package names similar to popular packages |
| ID | Pattern | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA1 | Unrestricted Tool Access | HIGH | Unfettered tool access without constraints |
| EA2 | Autonomous Deci |
$ claude mcp add SkillSpector \
-- python -m otcore.mcp_server <graph>