Function DeliverInbound

internal/loopback/loopback.go:215–251

DeliverInbound writes the recipient-side row for a loopback self-send and returns an identity.SendResult shaped for the ApproveAndSend send callback (or the worker's ExpireApproveAndSend send callback). Does NOT write the outbound row — the caller is one of: - HITL approval: the held outbound row a

(ctx context.Context, store InboundWriter, agent *identity.AgentIdentity, req outbound.SendRequest, fromDomain string)

//   - Domain verification + rate limit are enforced upstream by the
//     caller. Loopback isn't a backdoor for those gates.
func DeliverInbound(ctx context.Context, store InboundWriter, agent *identity.AgentIdentity, req outbound.SendRequest, fromDomain string) (identity.SendResult, error) {
	providerID := ProviderID(fromDomain)
	email := agent.EmailAddress()

	rawMessage, err := ComposeMIME(agent, req, providerID, fromDomain)
	if err != nil {
		return identity.SendResult{}, fmt.Errorf("loopback compose: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := store.CreateInboundMessage(
		ctx,
		"", // generate fresh id; mirrors the SMTP path which never reuses outbound ids
		agent.ID,
		email, // sender
		email, // recipient (per-delivery target)
		providerID,
		req.Subject,
		req.ConversationID,
		"unread",
		rawMessage,
		nil,   // no DKIM/SPF auth headers on a synthetic loopback
		nil,   // no auth verdict on a synthetic loopback
		false, // not flagged: loopback self-send bypasses the inbound policy gate
		"",    // no flag reason
		[]string{email},
		nil,                         // cc
		nil,                         // reply_to
		identity.InboundScreening{}, // loopback self-send: not externally screened
	); err != nil {
		return identity.SendResult{}, fmt.Errorf("loopback inbound row: %w", err)
	}

	return identity.SendResult{
		ProviderMessageID: providerID,
		Method:            "loopback",
		To:                []string{email},
	}, nil
}