| 329 | struct invoice_payment_hook_payload *); |
| 330 | |
| 331 | const struct invoice_details * |
| 332 | invoice_check_payment(const tal_t *ctx, |
| 333 | struct lightningd *ld, |
| 334 | const struct sha256 *payment_hash, |
| 335 | const struct amount_msat msat, |
| 336 | const struct amount_msat *expected_msat_override, |
| 337 | const struct secret *payment_secret, |
| 338 | const char **err) |
| 339 | { |
| 340 | u64 inv_dbid; |
| 341 | const struct invoice_details *details; |
| 342 | bool bolt12_payment; |
| 343 | |
| 344 | /* BOLT #4: |
| 345 | * - if the payment hash has already been paid: |
| 346 | * - MAY treat the payment hash as unknown. |
| 347 | * - MAY succeed in accepting the HTLC. |
| 348 | *... |
| 349 | * - if the payment hash is unknown: |
| 350 | * - MUST fail the HTLC. |
| 351 | * - MUST return an `incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details` error. |
| 352 | */ |
| 353 | if (!invoices_find_unpaid(ld->wallet->invoices, &inv_dbid, payment_hash)) { |
| 354 | if (invoices_find_by_rhash(ld->wallet->invoices, &inv_dbid, payment_hash)) { |
| 355 | *err = tal_fmt(ctx, "Already paid or expired invoice %s", |
| 356 | fmt_sha256(tmpctx, payment_hash)); |
| 357 | } else { |
| 358 | *err = tal_fmt(ctx, "Unknown invoice %s", |
| 359 | fmt_sha256(tmpctx, payment_hash)); |
| 360 | } |
| 361 | return NULL; |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | |
| 364 | details = invoices_get_details(ctx, ld->wallet->invoices, inv_dbid); |
| 365 | bolt12_payment = details->invstring && strstarts(details->invstring, "lni1"); |
| 366 | |
| 367 | /* BOLT #4: |
| 368 | * - if the `payment_secret` doesn't match the expected value for that |
| 369 | * `payment_hash`, or the `payment_secret` is required and is not |
| 370 | * present: |
| 371 | * - MUST fail the HTLC. |
| 372 | */ |
| 373 | /* For BOLT12: we stash path_secret in this field if it's of |
| 374 | * correct length, so it must be present */ |
| 375 | if ((feature_is_set(details->features, COMPULSORY_FEATURE(OPT_VAR_ONION)) |
| 376 | || bolt12_payment) |
| 377 | && !payment_secret) { |
| 378 | *err = tal_fmt(ctx, "Attempt to pay %s without secret", |
| 379 | fmt_sha256(tmpctx, &details->rhash)); |
| 380 | return tal_free(details); |
| 381 | } |
| 382 | |
| 383 | if (payment_secret) { |
| 384 | struct secret expected; |
| 385 | |
| 386 | /* FIXME: BOLT 12 should require a *real* secret: a signature of the |
| 387 | * request using the payer_id key. This just means they've |
| 388 | * *seen* the invoice! */ |
no test coverage detected