Function act_two_initiator2

connectd/handshake.c:533–608

}

static struct io_plan *act_two_initiator2(struct io_conn *conn,
					 struct handshake *h)
{
	SUPERVERBOSE("input: 0x%s", tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &h->act2, ACT_TWO_SIZE));

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 * 3. If `v` is an unrecognized handshake version, then the responder
	 *     MUST abort the connection attempt.
	 */
	if (h->act2.v != 0)
		return handshake_failed(conn, h);

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 *     * The raw bytes of the remote party's ephemeral public key
	 *       (`re`) are to be deserialized into a point on the curve using
	 *       affine coordinates as encoded by the key's serialized
	 *       composed format.
	 */
	if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ctx, &h->re.pubkey,
				      h->act2.pubkey, sizeof(h->act2.pubkey)) != 1)
		return handshake_failed(conn, h);

	SUPERVERBOSE("# re=0x%s", fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &h->re));

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 * 4. `h = SHA-256(h || re.serializeCompressed())`
	 */
	sha_mix_in_key(&h->h, &h->re);
	SUPERVERBOSE("# h=0x%s", tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &h->h, sizeof(h->h)));

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 * 5. `es = ECDH(s.priv, re)`
	 */
	if (!secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, h->ss->data, &h->re.pubkey,
			    h->e.priv.secret.data, NULL, NULL))
		return handshake_failed(conn, h);

	SUPERVERBOSE("# ss=0x%s", tal_hexstr(tmpctx, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss)));

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 * 6. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ee)`
	 *      * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
	 *        used to generate the authenticating MAC.
	 */
	hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
	SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k2=0x%s,0x%s",
		     tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &h->ck, sizeof(h->ck)),
		     tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &h->temp_k, sizeof(h->temp_k)));

	/* BOLT #8:
	 *
	 * 7. `p = decryptWithAD(temp_k2, 0, h, c)`
	 *     * If the MAC check in this operation fails, then the initiator