Function openchannel2_signed_deserialize

lightningd/dual_open_control.c:915–961

}

static bool
openchannel2_signed_deserialize(struct openchannel2_psbt_payload *payload,
				const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *toks)
{
	struct subd *dualopend = payload->dualopend;
	struct wally_psbt *psbt;

	if (!hook_extract_psbt(NULL, dualopend, buffer,
			       toks, "openchannel2_sign",
			       false, &psbt))
		return false;

	/* We require the PSBT to meet certain criteria such as
	 * extra, proprietary fields (`serial_id`s) or
	 * to have a `redeemscripts` iff the inputs are P2SH.
	 *
	 * Since this is externally provided, we confirm that
	 * they've done the right thing / haven't lost any required info.
	 */
	if (!psbt_has_required_fields(psbt))
		fatal("Plugin supplied PSBT that's missing required fields. %s",
		      fmt_wally_psbt(tmpctx, psbt));

	/* NOTE - The psbt_contribs_changed function nulls lots of
	 * fields in place to compare the PSBTs. This removes the
	 * witness stack held in final_witness.  Give it a clone of
	 * the PSBT to hack on instead ... */
	struct wally_psbt *psbt_clone;
	psbt_clone = clone_psbt(tmpctx, psbt);

	/* Verify that inputs/outputs are the same. Note that this is a
	 * 'de minimus' check -- we just look at serial_ids. If you've
	 * totally managled the data here but left the serial_ids intact,
	 * you'll get a failure back from the peer when you send
	 * commitment sigs */
	if (psbt_contribs_changed(payload->psbt, psbt_clone))
		fatal("Plugin must not change psbt input/output set. "
		      "orig: %s. updated: %s",
		      fmt_wally_psbt(tmpctx, payload->psbt),
		      fmt_wally_psbt(tmpctx, psbt));

	if (payload->psbt)
		tal_free(payload->psbt);

	payload->psbt = tal_steal(payload, psbt);
	return true;
}

static void dualopend_tell_depth(struct channel *channel,
				 const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,