| 1260 | } |
| 1261 | |
| 1262 | static char *do_commit_signed_received(const tal_t *ctx, |
| 1263 | const u8 *msg, |
| 1264 | struct state *state, |
| 1265 | struct tx_state *tx_state, |
| 1266 | struct bitcoin_tx **local_commit, |
| 1267 | struct bitcoin_signature *remote_sig) |
| 1268 | { |
| 1269 | const u8 *wscript; |
| 1270 | char *error; |
| 1271 | struct channel_id cid; |
| 1272 | secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs; |
| 1273 | struct tlv_commitment_signed_tlvs *cs_tlv |
| 1274 | = tlv_commitment_signed_tlvs_new(tmpctx); |
| 1275 | |
| 1276 | if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg, &cid, |
| 1277 | &remote_sig->s, |
| 1278 | &htlc_sigs, &cs_tlv)) |
| 1279 | open_err_fatal(state, "Parsing commitment signed %s", |
| 1280 | tal_hex(tmpctx, msg)); |
| 1281 | |
| 1282 | remote_sig->sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL; |
| 1283 | check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id); |
| 1284 | |
| 1285 | if (htlc_sigs != NULL) |
| 1286 | open_err_fatal(state, "Must not send HTLCs with first" |
| 1287 | " commitment. %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg)); |
| 1288 | |
| 1289 | *local_commit = initial_channel_tx(ctx, &wscript, state->channel, |
| 1290 | &state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL], |
| 1291 | LOCAL, NULL, &error); |
| 1292 | |
| 1293 | /* This shouldn't happen either, AFAICT. */ |
| 1294 | if (!*local_commit) |
| 1295 | return tal_fmt(ctx, "Could not meet our fees" |
| 1296 | " and reserve: %s", error); |
| 1297 | |
| 1298 | validate_initial_commitment_signature(HSM_FD, *local_commit, remote_sig); |
| 1299 | |
| 1300 | /* BOLT #2: |
| 1301 | * |
| 1302 | * The recipient: |
| 1303 | * - if `signature` is incorrect OR non-compliant with LOW-S-standard |
| 1304 | * rule...: |
| 1305 | * - MUST send a `warning` and close the connection, or send an |
| 1306 | * `error` and fail the channel. |
| 1307 | */ |
| 1308 | if (!check_tx_sig(*local_commit, 0, NULL, wscript, |
| 1309 | &state->their_funding_pubkey, remote_sig)) { |
| 1310 | /* BOLT #1: |
| 1311 | * |
| 1312 | * - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check: |
| 1313 | * - SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply |
| 1314 | * to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`, |
| 1315 | * `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message. |
| 1316 | */ |
| 1317 | /*~ This verbosity is not only useful for our own testing, but |
| 1318 | * a courtesy to other implementaters whose brains may be so |
| 1319 | * twisted by coding in Go, Scala and Rust that they can no |
no test coverage detected