Function handle_validate_commitment_tx

hsmd/libhsmd.c:1368–1414

~This stub implementation is overriden by fully validating signers * that need to independently verify the peer's signatures. */

/* ~This stub implementation is overriden by fully validating signers
 * that need to independently verify the peer's signatures. */
static u8 *handle_validate_commitment_tx(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	struct simple_htlc **htlc;
	u64 commit_num;
	u32 feerate;
	struct bitcoin_signature sig;
	struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs;
	struct secret channel_seed;
	struct sha256 shaseed;
	struct secret *old_secret;
	struct pubkey next_per_commitment_point;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_validate_commitment_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
						  &tx, &htlc,
						  &commit_num, &feerate,
						  &sig, &htlc_sigs))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	/* Stub implementation */

	/* The signatures are not checked in this stub because they
	 * are already checked by the caller.  However, the returned
	 * old_secret and next_per_commitment_point are used.
	 */

	get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
	if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");

	if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &next_per_commitment_point, commit_num + 1))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    c, msg_in, "bad per_commit_point %" PRIu64, commit_num + 1);

	if (commit_num >= 1) {
		old_secret = tal(tmpctx, struct secret);
		if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, old_secret, commit_num - 1)) {
			return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
			    c, msg_in, "Cannot derive secret %" PRIu64, commit_num - 1);
		}
	} else {
		old_secret = NULL;
	}

	return towire_hsmd_validate_commitment_tx_reply(
		NULL, old_secret, &next_per_commitment_point);
}

/* This stub implementation is overriden by fully validating signers
 * that need to independently verify that the latest state is