#1955: the HELLO must prove the peer runs this daemon's build. The cheap * proof is "same image file as the daemon"; a peer running a DIFFERENT file * with identical bytes (a second install path, a package-manager copy) needs * the full fingerprint, i.e. hashing the whole (~300 MB) image. That hash is * slower than the client's HELLO budget, so the client abandoned it and every * re-probe sta
| 1050 | * later admissions of the same unchanged file match it by metadata, exactly |
| 1051 | * like the active image. The accepted set of images is unchanged. */ |
| 1052 | static runtime_peer_image_verdict_t runtime_peer_image_verify(cbm_daemon_runtime_service_t *service, |
| 1053 | uint64_t process_id, |
| 1054 | const char *requested_build) { |
| 1055 | runtime_process_image_reference_t peer; |
| 1056 | runtime_process_image_reference_init(&peer); |
| 1057 | bool peer_held = runtime_process_image_reference_acquire(process_id, &peer, NULL); |
| 1058 | bool known = false; |
| 1059 | if (peer_held) { |
| 1060 | known = runtime_process_image_reference_same(&service->active_image, &peer); |
| 1061 | #ifdef CBM_ENABLE_TEST_SEAMS |
| 1062 | if (atomic_load(&runtime_force_peer_image_distinct_copy_seam)) { |
| 1063 | known = false; |
| 1064 | } |
| 1065 | #endif |
| 1066 | if (!known) { |
| 1067 | cbm_mutex_lock(&service->mutex); |
| 1068 | known = runtime_verified_peer_image_known_locked(service, &peer); |
| 1069 | cbm_mutex_unlock(&service->mutex); |
| 1070 | } |
| 1071 | } |
| 1072 | bool released = runtime_process_image_reference_release(&peer); |
| 1073 | if (known && released) { |
| 1074 | return RUNTIME_PEER_IMAGE_VERIFIED; |
| 1075 | } |
| 1076 | |
| 1077 | char fingerprint[CBM_DAEMON_BUILD_FINGERPRINT_SIZE]; |
| 1078 | runtime_process_image_reference_t hashed; |
| 1079 | runtime_process_image_reference_init(&hashed); |
| 1080 | runtime_note_peer_image_hash(); |
| 1081 | bool fingerprinted = runtime_process_image_reference_acquire(process_id, &hashed, fingerprint); |
| 1082 | bool verified = fingerprinted && strcmp(fingerprint, requested_build) == 0 && |
| 1083 | strcmp(fingerprint, service->identity.build_fingerprint) == 0; |
| 1084 | if (verified) { |
| 1085 | cbm_mutex_lock(&service->mutex); |
| 1086 | if (service->verified_peer_image_count < RUNTIME_VERIFIED_PEER_IMAGE_CAPACITY && |
| 1087 | !runtime_verified_peer_image_known_locked(service, &hashed)) { |
| 1088 | service->verified_peer_images[service->verified_peer_image_count++] = hashed; |
| 1089 | runtime_process_image_reference_init(&hashed); |
| 1090 | } |
| 1091 | cbm_mutex_unlock(&service->mutex); |
| 1092 | } |
| 1093 | (void)runtime_process_image_reference_release(&hashed); |
| 1094 | if (verified) { |
| 1095 | return RUNTIME_PEER_IMAGE_VERIFIED; |
| 1096 | } |
| 1097 | return fingerprinted ? RUNTIME_PEER_IMAGE_MISMATCH : RUNTIME_PEER_IMAGE_UNVERIFIABLE; |
| 1098 | } |
| 1099 | |
| 1100 | static void runtime_verified_peer_images_release(cbm_daemon_runtime_service_t *service) { |
| 1101 | for (size_t i = 0; i < service->verified_peer_image_count; i++) { |
no test coverage detected