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hub / github.com/DeusData/codebase-memory-mcp / win_runtime_directory_secure

Function win_runtime_directory_secure

src/daemon/ipc.c:5156–5264  ·  view source on GitHub ↗

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5154}
5155
5156static bool win_runtime_directory_secure(const wchar_t *runtime_dir) {
5157 win_security_t security;
5158 if (!win_security_init(&security)) {
5159 return false;
5160 }
5161 bool created = CreateDirectoryW(runtime_dir, &security.directory_attributes) != 0;
5162 DWORD create_error = created ? ERROR_SUCCESS : GetLastError();
5163 if (!created && create_error != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
5164 char message[96];
5165 (void)snprintf(message, sizeof(message),
5166 "could not create the directory (Windows error %lu)",
5167 (unsigned long)create_error);
5168 ipc_validation_detail_set_for_path(runtime_dir, message);
5169 win_security_destroy(&security);
5170 return false;
5171 }
5172 DWORD attributes = GetFileAttributesW(runtime_dir);
5173 if (attributes == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES || (attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) == 0 ||
5174 (attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) != 0) {
5175 /* What already exists at this path is adopted only if it is a plain
5176 * directory. Say which rule refused it: the walk in front of this
5177 * function tolerates losing a creation race, so this check is what
5178 * stands between that tolerance and a planted file or junction. */
5179 const char *rule = attributes == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES ? "cannot be inspected"
5180 : (attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) == 0
5181 ? "exists but is not a directory"
5182 : "is a reparse point (junction or symlink)";
5183 ipc_validation_detail_set_for_path(runtime_dir, rule);
5184 win_security_destroy(&security);
5185 return false;
5186 }
5187 HANDLE directory =
5188 CreateFileW(runtime_dir, READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER,
5189 FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
5190 FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL);
5191 bool can_write_owner = directory != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
5192 if (!can_write_owner) {
5193 directory =
5194 CreateFileW(runtime_dir, READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC,
5195 FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
5196 FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL);
5197 }
5198 if (directory == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
5199 win_security_destroy(&security);
5200 return false;
5201 }
5202 BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION file_info;
5203 bool valid_handle = GetFileInformationByHandle(directory, &file_info) != 0 &&
5204 (file_info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0 &&
5205 (file_info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) == 0;
5206 bool owner_exact = valid_handle && win_file_owner_secure(&security, directory, true);
5207 /* One-time normalization of the admin-group default-owner artifact: a
5208 * directory created by plain mkdir under an Administrators-default-owner
5209 * token (standard policy on Windows Server) is born owned by BUILTIN\
5210 * Administrators even though it is this account's own private dir. A
5211 * TRUSTED owner (the launcher's directory policy: SYSTEM, Administrators,
5212 * TrustedInstaller) is re-stamped to the exact token user inside the same
5213 * repair that already re-protects the DACL; any other owner remains

Callers 1

Calls 9

win_security_initFunction · 0.85
win_security_destroyFunction · 0.85
win_file_owner_secureFunction · 0.85
win_file_security_secureFunction · 0.85

Tested by

no test coverage detected