Function win_runtime_directory_secure

src/daemon/ipc.c:4114–4179

}

static bool win_runtime_directory_secure(const wchar_t *runtime_dir) {
    win_security_t security;
    if (!win_security_init(&security)) {
        return false;
    }
    bool created = CreateDirectoryW(runtime_dir, &security.directory_attributes) != 0;
    if (!created && GetLastError() != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
        win_security_destroy(&security);
        return false;
    }
    DWORD attributes = GetFileAttributesW(runtime_dir);
    if (attributes == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES || (attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) == 0 ||
        (attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) != 0) {
        win_security_destroy(&security);
        return false;
    }
    HANDLE directory =
        CreateFileW(runtime_dir, READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER,
                    FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
                    FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL);
    bool can_write_owner = directory != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    if (!can_write_owner) {
        directory =
            CreateFileW(runtime_dir, READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC,
                        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
                        FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL);
    }
    if (directory == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        win_security_destroy(&security);
        return false;
    }
    BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION file_info;
    bool valid_handle = GetFileInformationByHandle(directory, &file_info) != 0 &&
                        (file_info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0 &&
                        (file_info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) == 0;
    bool owner_exact = valid_handle && win_file_owner_secure(&security, directory, true);
    /* One-time normalization of the admin-group default-owner artifact: a
     * directory created by plain mkdir under an Administrators-default-owner
     * token (standard policy on Windows Server) is born owned by BUILTIN\
     * Administrators even though it is this account's own private dir. A
     * TRUSTED owner (the launcher's directory policy: SYSTEM, Administrators,
     * TrustedInstaller) is re-stamped to the exact token user inside the same
     * repair that already re-protects the DACL; any other owner remains
     * refused, and the final validation below still demands the exact user. */
    bool owner_ok = owner_exact || (valid_handle && can_write_owner &&
                                    win_file_owner_secure(&security, directory, false));
    DWORD secure_result = ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
    if (valid_handle && owner_ok) {
        secure_result = security.set_security_info(
            directory, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
            (owner_exact ? 0U : (DWORD)OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION) | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
                PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
            owner_exact ? NULL : security.user_sid, NULL, security.directory_acl, NULL);
    }
    if (valid_handle && owner_ok && secure_result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ipc_validation_detail_set("owner/DACL repair failed (status %lu%s)",
                                  (unsigned long)secure_result,
                                  can_write_owner ? "" : ", WRITE_OWNER unavailable");