Class UserAPIKeyAuth

litellm/proxy/_types.py:2629–2768

Return the row in the db

class UserAPIKeyAuth(LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView):  # the expected response object for user api key auth
    """
    Return the row in the db
    """

    api_key: str | None = None
    user_role: LitellmUserRoles | None = None
    allowed_model_region: AllowedModelRegion | None = None
    parent_otel_span: Span | None = None
    rpm_limit_per_model: dict[str, int] | None = None
    tpm_limit_per_model: dict[str, int] | None = None
    user_tpm_limit: int | None = None
    user_rpm_limit: int | None = None
    user_email: str | None = None
    user_spend: float | None = None
    user_max_budget: float | None = None
    request_route: str | None = None
    is_session_token: bool = False
    # Server-only marker set exclusively by the MCP gateway admission path
    # (_reload_admitted_user) for a keyless user-subject admitted via a gateway DCR session
    # bearer or bridge envelope. Not a DB column and never populated from caller-controlled key
    # metadata or JWT claims, so it cannot be forged to gain the team-inherited MCP grant union
    # or to escape the caller-Authorization egress scrub. exclude=True keeps it out of serialization.
    mcp_admitted_user_subject: bool = Field(default=False, exclude=True)
    # team_id -> that team's mcp_rpm_limit map, for a keyless admitted subject that reaches MCP
    # servers through several teams at once and therefore has no single team_id for the limiter to
    # key off. Server-only and stripped from validated input for the same reason as the marker
    # above: a forged entry would let a caller pick which team's rpm bucket it is charged against.
    mcp_source_team_rpm_limits: dict[str, dict[str, int]] | None = Field(default=None, exclude=True)
    via_virtual_key: bool = Field(
        default=False,
        exclude=True,
        description=(
            "Server-only marker set exclusively by the DB virtual-key and master-key auth paths via "
            "post-construction assignment. Stripped from validated input so custom auth handlers, JWT "
            "claims, or key metadata cannot forge it. Gates overwrite_user_with_key_hash stamping: only "
            "a credential the proxy itself validated as a key may be forwarded as the provider-facing "
            "user id."
        ),
    )
    budget_reservation: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None, exclude=True)
    budget_throttle_pct: float | None = Field(default=None, exclude=True)
    user: Any | None = None  # Expanded user object when expand=user is used
    created_by_user: Any | None = None  # Expanded created_by user when expand=user is used
    end_user_object_permission: LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionTable | None = None
    # Team object_permission preloaded in auth (e.g. get_team_object) to avoid
    # per-request object_permission fetches in downstream checks (vector stores, etc.)
    team_object_permission: LiteLLM_ObjectPermissionTable | None = None
    # Decoded upstream IdP claims (groups, roles, etc.) propagated by JWT auth machinery
    # and forwarded into outbound tokens by guardrails such as MCPJWTSigner.
    jwt_claims: dict | None = None

    model_config = ConfigDict(arbitrary_types_allowed=True)

    @model_validator(mode="before")
    @classmethod
    def check_api_key(cls, values):
        # If values is already an instance (not a dict), return it as-is