| 493 | } |
| 494 | |
| 495 | bool randomBytes(void* out, size_t size) override |
| 496 | { |
| 497 | // ps:ps owns the hardware RNG. Opened and closed around the call |
| 498 | // rather than held: this runs a handful of times per script run. |
| 499 | if (R_SUCCEEDED(psInit())) { |
| 500 | const Result res = PS_GenerateRandomBytes(out, size); |
| 501 | psExit(); |
| 502 | if (R_SUCCEEDED(res)) { |
| 503 | return true; |
| 504 | } |
| 505 | } |
| 506 | // ps unavailable. Every seal draws a fresh salt as well as a fresh |
| 507 | // nonce, and the salt is what the key is derived from, so what this |
| 508 | // fallback has to guarantee is not secrecy but that two seals never |
| 509 | // come out with the same pair — a tick counter that never repeats |
| 510 | // within a boot, hashed with a call counter, does that. |
| 511 | static u32 calls = 0; |
| 512 | uint8_t* dest = (uint8_t*)out; |
| 513 | while (size > 0) { |
| 514 | const u64 tick = svcGetSystemTick(); |
| 515 | const u64 now = osGetTime(); |
| 516 | const u32 seq = calls++; |
| 517 | uint8_t digest[32]; |
| 518 | mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; |
| 519 | mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); |
| 520 | mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx, 0); |
| 521 | mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&tick, sizeof(tick)); |
| 522 | mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&now, sizeof(now)); |
| 523 | mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&seq, sizeof(seq)); |
| 524 | mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, digest); |
| 525 | mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx); |
| 526 | const size_t chunk = size < sizeof(digest) ? size : sizeof(digest); |
| 527 | memcpy(dest, digest, chunk); |
| 528 | dest += chunk; |
| 529 | size -= chunk; |
| 530 | } |
| 531 | return true; |
| 532 | } |
| 533 | |
| 534 | void lowerPriority(void) override |
| 535 | { |